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We propose and evaluate a newmetric for understanding the depen-
dence of the Internet on individual routers.Whereas prior work uses
large volumes of reachability probes to infer outages, we design an
efficient active probing technique that directly and unambiguously
reveals router restarts. We use our technique to survey 149,560
routers across the Internet for 2.5 years. 59,175 of the surveyed
routers (40%) experience at least one reboot, and we quantify the
resulting impact of each router outage on global IPv4 and IPv6 BGP
reachability.
Our technique complements existing data and control plane out-
age analysis methods by providing a causal link from BGP reacha-
bility failures to the responsible router(s) and multi-homing config-
urations. While we found the Internet core to be largely robust, we
identified specific routers that were single points of failure for the
prefixes they advertised. In total, 2,385 routers – 4.0% of the routers
that restarted over the course of 2.5 years of probing – were single
points of failure for 3,396 IPv6 prefixes announced by 1,708 ASes.
We inferred 59% of these routers were the customer-edge border
router. 2,374 (70%) of the withdrawn prefixes were not covered by
a less specific prefix, so 1,726 routers (2.9%) of those that restarted
were single points of failure for at least one network. However, a
covering route did not imply reachability during a router outage,
as no previously-responsive address in a withdrawn more specific
prefix responded during a one-week sample. We validate our reboot
and single point of failure inference techniques with four networks,
finding no false positive or false negative reboots, but find some
false negatives in our single point of failure inferences.
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1 INTRODUCTION
While the Internet is well-established as critical infrastructure, its
complex ecosystem of systems, users, applications, and service
providers make an accurate assessment of resilience difficult. At
the infrastructure substrate, networks may utilize routing protocols
and multiple routers, links, and providers to take advantage of
available diversity, and to gain redundancy and resilience to failure.
In this paper, we take a new step towards understanding Internet
reliability by examining individual router reboots and measuring
the broader global impact of these outages.
Graph-theoretic approaches to understanding and characterizing
resilience [1, 12] are notoriously fragile [31, 49] due to the underly-
ing difficulty in obtaining accurate Internet topologies [11, 23, 44].
While a router may appear central to a network’s connectivity,
significant redundancy may be invisible to measurement. Despite
a pressing need for complete and sound data on Internet infras-
tructure resilience, the inherently global, unregulated, complex,
and decentralized nature of the Internet makes obtaining such data
challenging. Attempts to quantify the network’s resilience have
largely come from researchers attempting to infer outages, attacks,
and their causes from noisy and incomplete data. For instance,
prior work has shown that continual, high-volume probing of edge
devices can expose more reachability failures than control-plane
analysis alone [39, 43], while [17] uses control plane analysis to
identify failures and tomography to isolate their causes.
In contrast, we seek to empirically quantify the dependence of
interdomain routing on individual routers. We employ an efficient
active probing technique that elicits IPv6 fragment identifiers from
routers. These 32-bit fragment identifiers are commonly mono-
tonic, unambiguously and directly exposing router reboots when
there is a discontinuity in the sampled sequence [7]. While our
restart inference technique is only effective for routers with an IPv6
control plane, we show in §5 that the restart events we find also
frequently manifest as IPv4 BGP churn and withdrawals due to the
preponderance of IPv4/IPv6 infrastructure sharing [16].
We survey 149,560 distinct routers over 2.5 years. We associate
each router with a set of destinations (IPv4 and IPv6 network pre-
fixes) reachable via that router, as indicated by analysis of CAIDA’s
traceroute topology data [10]. We opportunistically correlate each
observed router outage with BGP control plane activity – the se-
quence of globally visible BGP update and withdrawal messages for
the associated prefixes observed at the Routeviews looking glass –
to shed light on the impact of more than 2.5 years of such events
on global IPv4 and IPv6 BGP reachability.
In addition to localizing BGP reachability failures to responsible
routers and configurations, we identify specific routers that are
single points of failure for their networks. Surprisingly, we find that
4.0% of the surveyed routers were relied on by their AS to announce
a prefix in BGP. In summary, our contributions include:
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(1) A new perspective on characterizing the importance of
individual routers on Internet resilience.
(2) An Internet-wide large-scale measurement campaign to
identify and characterize router restarts over 2.5 years.
(3) Correlation of restarts against ≈12M BGP update messages
to quantify their global IPv4 and IPv6 reachability impact.
(4) Identification of 2,385 individual routers in the global topol-
ogy that represented single-points of failure for 1,708 ASes.
(5) Week-long high-frequency active probing of networks be-
hind rebooting routers to assess the impact of the reboot
on the data-plane.
(6) Public release of the source code for our adaptive probing
engine as part of scamper [32].
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section 2
provides background and context, while §3 gives an overview of the
extensive prior work in measuring and mitigating network outages.
Section 4 details our methodology and data, while §5 provides
the results of our extended, Internet-wide measurement study. We
conclude in §6 with a discussion on the broader implications of our
findings and suggestions for future research.
2 BACKGROUND
We start with background on our technique for inferring router
restarts, a discussion of our use of BGP in understanding the effect
of router restarts, as well as a summary of the myriad ways in which
networks interconnect, deploy redundancy, and attempt to provide
resilience. Based on the different multi-homing configurations, we
discuss the expected effects of a router restart to provide context
for our results in §5.
2.1 Router Restarts
In contrast to prior efforts that indirectly localize outages, black-
holes, and reachability faults (e.g., via traceroutes, topology atlases,
tomography, etc), we directly interrogate the control-plane IPv6
stack on routers in order to unambiguously determine whether the
router has restarted. At a high-level, we construct a per-router time
series of IP Identifier (IPID) values from fragmented IPv6 response
packets, and use discontinuities in the series to infer that the router
restarted some time during the polling interval.
We focus on IPv6 routers for two reasons. First, as we show in
§4.1.1, probing routers affords significant efficiencies as compared
to probing edge systems, where even finding a stable set of edge
IPv6 addresses presents a practical difficulty. Second, probing IPv6
routers allows us to unambiguously determine that a router re-
booted, rather than relying on fragile tomography inferences. Only
IPv6 routers provide a clean signal that allows us to reliably infer
that a restart occurred. While the IPv4 stack on routers also has an
IPID field, it is both small (16-bits) and has natural velocity since
every control packet the router originates must have an IPID [5] in
case the packet is fragmented in the network. In contrast, the IPv6
IPID field is 32-bits in size with no natural velocity because routers
rarely send fragmented packets, and only the sender can fragment
a packet. The small size of the IPv4 IPID field, combined with the
fact that a router may send packets in bursts due to operational
and control traffic, makes it infeasible to distinguish an IPv4 router
restart from a counter wrap.
The IPID field is an optional IPv6 extension header. To obtain
fragmented responses, we use our method from [7] and send 1300-
byte ICMP6 echo request packets to router interfaces; upon receipt
of an ICMP6 echo reply larger than 1280 bytes, we respond with
an ICMP6 packet too big message asking the receiver to reduce
its packet size to 1280 bytes. This process induces the router to
fragment subsequent ICMP6 echo replies, exposing the router’s
IPv6 IPID counter values. In our data, 27.1% of router interfaces
that responded for at least 14 days during our 2.5 years of probing
assigned IPID values from a counter; others assigned values from
a pseudo random number generator, did not send fragmented re-
sponses to our probes, had fragments blocked along the reverse
path, or ICMP packet too big messages were blocked along the
forward path. A responsive router with a monotonic sequence that
resets therefore represents a restart. Section 4.1 provides our full
algorithm for inferring a router outage.
2.2 BGP
The Border Gateway Protocol version 4 (BGP) is the protocol used
by ASes to organize interdomain routing [40, 41]. To quantify the
impact of an inferred router outage, we examine the sequence of
BGP messages received at the Routeviews looking glass. In this
section, we discuss subtleties of BGP that manifest in the BGP
update and withdrawal messages we can observe, and how they
can impact our ability to correlate BGP activity with router outages.
An AS exchanges network-layer reachability information with
neighboring ASes according to the configuration applied by the
router’s operator. An AS establishes a session with a neighbor
using TCP, and each peer keeps state regarding which prefixes are
reachable; a neighbor may announce new routes, withdraw existing
routes, or update routes.
Ending a BGP session: A router may end a BGP session grace-
fully by notifying the peer that it is closing the session, or by closing
the TCP connection. A graceful shutdown occurs when an operator
halts, reboots, or changes the configuration of a router to remove
the peer. A router will not shutdown a BGP session gracefully if the
neighbor router crashes or fails, or if a physical link between the
peers is broken and the router does not detect the link failure. A
router infers that a peer has failed if it does not receive a BGP keep-
alive message from the peer within the hold time period agreed by
the peers using the BGP protocol [41]. The BGP specification sug-
gests that routers send keep-alive messages at 30 second intervals,
and wait 90 seconds after receiving a keep-alive message before
deciding the BGP session has failed. However, the Cisco default is
to send keep-alive messages at 60 second intervals, and wait 180
seconds before deciding the BGP session has failed. A router may
infer a BGP session with a peer has failed more quickly if the oper-
ator configures a shorter hold time for the peer, or if the operator
configures Bidirectional Forwarding Detection [25], which allows
the router to verify the peer is responsive at the network layer.
Path hunting: When a router’s BGP session with a peer fails
or is gracefully shutdown, the router removes the routes it received
from that peer from its Routing Information Base (RIB). The router
then runs a decision process to select alternative routes for the
withdrawn routes that were previously the best available for the
prefixes. If the router has no other route available for a prefix, it
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sends a withdrawal notice to its peers, causing them to remove the
route from their RIBs and to run the BGP route decision process.
Depending on the availability of alternative routes, routers may
begin path hunting or path exploration, where a router replaces
the withdrawn route with what it believes to be a valid route with
a different path. However, if the replacement route is via a path
affected by the same failure, the replacement route may also be sub-
sequently withdrawn or updated as routing information converges.
This activity typically induces a burst of withdrawal and update
messages to propagate through the Internet, so-called “churn.”
Route flap damping: Excessive BGP control traffic and churn
is a source of instability in the network if BGP routers are un-
able to process BGP control traffic at the same rate it arrives. The
BGP specifications [40, 41] recommend that BGP routers use a
Minimum Route Advertisement Interval (MRAI) of 30 seconds for
routes exchanged between ASes. The initial BGP specification rec-
ommends that the MRAI not apply to withdrawn routes [40], how-
ever an update to the specification includes withdrawn routes in
the MRAI [41]. In practice, the MRAI is applied per-neighbor, rather
than per prefix. To further reduce the impact of unstable routes
sustained over long time-scales, the IETF standardized a protocol
for route flap damping [47]. A router that uses route flap damping
(RFD) scores each prefix according to recent activity, penalizing
prefixes that contribute significant BGP load by suppressing up-
dated routes for the prefix at increasingly long durations, up to one
hour. Individual network operators make their own decisions about
the configuration and deployment of MRAI and RFD.
2.3 Network Redundancy
Network redundancy is implemented in a wide variety of ways,
and the resulting control-plane artifacts and failure-modes can
be both subtle and complex. A customer, which we informally
define as an entity at the network edge that pays for access from
a service provider, can have redundant i) routers; ii) links; and iii)
providers. This redundancy may be utilized via load-balancing, only
during failures, or deployed in more complex configurations (e.g.,
via selective advertisement of more specific prefix announcements)
[3]. In this work, we focus on the role routers play in providing
network resilience, and ignore failures of links connecting routers
(e.g., a severed long-haul optical link).
The types of customer connectivity range from the cross-product
of single versus multiple customer edge routers, single versus mul-
tiple provider edge routers, and the use of a single or multiple
providers. In the most basic case, no redundancy exists: a single
customer edge router connects to a single provider edge router, and
requires neither BGP nor provider-independent address space. We
expect outages of these customer edge routers to have no impact
or discernible effect on the global BGP control-plane.
The more interesting case, and the focus of this paper, involves
a customer with their own AS and address space. Regional Internet
Registries (RIRs) require a multi-homing plan for an organization
to obtain an AS number. Perhaps surprisingly, we uncover a non-
trivial number of singly-homed customers in this class. An outage
of such a customer or their provider’s router will manifest as a
series of withdrawal and update messages in the global BGP system
during path exploration. Eventually, we observe all Routeviews
peers withdrawing the customer’s prefix. A significant component
of our work is determining, for a given customer’s network prefix,
the provider and customer edge routers (see §4.2).
More complex scenarios invoke more subtle behaviors. While
we do not know the cause of a router reboot, a single router outage
should not cause a complete prefix withdrawal if the network is
multi-homed with at least two routers. For instance, we observe sig-
nificant BGP churn for customers with multiple routers connected
to either a single or multiple provider. The presence of an available
alternate path is implied by BGP activity at a remote looking glass
stabilizing after the outage as BGP converges to an alternate path.
We therefore classify the resultant per-prefix global BGP activity
due to a router outage as either: i) none; ii) churn; iii) partial with-
drawal, where a fraction of the peers withdraw; or iv) complete
withdrawal, where all peers withdraw such that the looking glass
has no available path (see §4.3).
3 RELATEDWORK
Significant prior work examines network resilience in general, and
Internet outages in particular. Our research extends this body of
prior work in several crucial ways, by: i) providing wide breadth and
scope, including 2.5 years worth of Internet-wide measurements;
ii) taking a first-step toward understanding the impact of router
outages; and iii) empirically identifying routers that represent single
points of failure for their connected customers. In this section, we
provide an abbreviated taxonomy of prior work and its relation to
our research.
Empirical work on outages, reachability, and failure includes
passive and active measurement at both the control plane and data
plane. These techniques have been applied within a single AS,
across vantage points, and across the entire Internet.
For instance, passive analysis, clustering, and temporal grouping
of BGP routing messages can reveal insights into events of interest
[50] and their origins [20, 45]. As purely passive techniques are
most effective with a complete view of all routing activity within a
single AS [22], localizing and inferring causes of outages outside
of a single domain is challenging [9]. Dainotti et al. [15] employ
a novel technique that synthesizes two sources of passive data:
network telescopes and control-plane activity. Their work shows
that backscatter observed at their network telescope can correlate
with BGP activity and known macro-level outages [6].
Both Trinocular [39] and Pingin’ in the Rain [43] send continual
data-plane probes to the network edge from dedicatedmeasurement
nodes to discover reachability issues, while Choffnes et al. enlist
BitTorrent nodes to crowdsource measurements[13]. These systems
reveal insights into the real-world availability experienced by end
nodes, and demonstrate that reachability correlates with natural
disasters, severe weather, and known political events. However,
these methods require significant volumes of probing traffic and
cannot directly implicate a particular router as the root cause.
Prior work showed promise toward fusing data and control plane
analysis. For instance, Feamster et al. [19] and Wang et al. [48] uti-
lized continual active measurements between a mesh of dedicated
measurement nodes, and correlated BGP activity observed with
reachability problems. Our work takes an Internet-wide view of
outages, without requiring a full-mesh of measurement nodes.
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A large body of research investigated, localized, and proposed
methods to mitigate network reachability blackholes – instances
of end-to-end path failures that are avoidable, in that a policy-
compliant route exists but is not used by the forwarding path [14,
17, 26, 27, 29]. Many of these works used tomography algorithms
to locate faults. Rather than examining silent reachability faults,
our work centers on router outages. While Iannaccone et al. [24]
provided a detailed analysis of router failures within the Sprint
backbone, and [46] examined availability in a regional network
via logfile analysis, our focus is on Internet-wide identification of
router outages and their impact.
In this work we extend our method in [7] to perform direct and
unambiguous measurement of IPv6 router restarts, rather than re-
lying on error-prone inferences. Whereas [7] simply characterized
the prevalence of observed router reboots via coarse-grained prob-
ing every six hours, we implement an adaptive probing algorithm
based on each router’s behavior to enable efficient fine-grained
sampling. This study is significantly broader in scope and duration.
Further, we close the causal loop by tying observed reboots with
the resulting impact (or lack of impact) on BGP – thereby providing
a new way to concretely differentiate critical (i.e. single point of
failure) routers from more resilient configurations.
4 METHODOLOGY
Our methodology involves addressing three distinct aspects of
router outage characterization:
(1) Identifying router restarts (§4.1): We utilize macroscopic
traceroute data to identify IPv6 router interfaces, a novel adaptive-
rate active probing technique that identifies router restarts, and
IPv6 alias resolution techniques to reduce interfaces to routers.
(2) Associating networks with routers (§4.2): We again use
traceroute data to find interfaces along the forward path to each
network prefix. We then label routers with their relative distance
from the customer edge border router. We use a similar procedure
to map routers to the IPv4 prefixes for which they were responsible.
(3) Associating router restarts with BGP activity (§4.3): Fi-
nally, we correlate global BGP data, both RIBs and BGP messages,
from the Routeviews looking glass as part of a large-scale data-
fusion effort. We juxtapose these three sources of data to correlate
inferred outages with their impact on the global routing system.
Figure 1 depicts the components of our methodology for fusing
large uptime IPID time series with Routeviews BGP updates and
traceroute data in order to identify single points of failure.
4.1 Inferring Router Outages
Our router outage inference consists of two components: i) active
router probing; and ii) identifying reboots from the responses.
4.1.1 Probing. Beverly et al. performed a five month uptime
study of 66,471 IPv6 interfaces [7], and sent six probes every six
hours regardless of the nature of previous responses. In this work,
we use macroscopic CAIDA IPv6 traceroute topology data [10] to
identify a much larger set of IPv6 router interfaces as probe targets,
which mandates a more adaptive probing approach. Bandwidth
spent probing interfaces that produce no or random responses




















Figure 1: Method overview: correlation between inferred re-
boots of AS border routers and BGP updates identify routers
that are single points of failure for prefixes they advertise.
study, we found the way interfaces respond can change, e.g., from
predictable to random or vice-versa; while we wish to minimize
probing of interfaces that are not amenable to probing, we must
periodically check them.
Therefore, we implemented an optimized prober that regularly
samples interfaces that respond with monotonically increasing
IPID sequences, and periodically samples interfaces that do not. Our
prober operates in rounds, and solicits a single fragmented response
from each interface that responds with a monotonic sequence. If
the value in the IPID field is less than the previous value our prober
received from the same interface, our prober sends six further
probes to determine if the router is still assigning IPID values from
a counter. If an interface that was sending a monotonic sequence
goes silent, our prober continues to solicit a single fragmented
response for up to two hours, before scheduling the interface for
probing less frequently.
The measurement parameters we used during this study evolved
over the 2.5 year period. To start with, we used a static list of 83,393
interface addresses that appeared in CAIDA IPv6 traceroutes for De-
cember 2014, and probed these at 100pps from 18 January 2015 until
18 October 2016. Systems that did not respond with an increment-
ing IPID value for more than two hours were subsequently probed
every 12-24 hours. From 18 October 2016 until 24 February 2017, we
used a static list of 1,086,047 addresses observed in CAIDA’s June
to October 2016 traceroute data. To maintain a 15-minute round,
we increased our probing rate to 225 pps. Finally, on 24 February
2017, we transitioned to a more dynamic probing algorithm, where
we added addresses newly observed in traceroute to the list every
two hours, and to further reduce our probing burden, we probed
addresses that did not send incrementing IPID values every 7-14
days. By 30 May 2017, the list had grown to ≈2.4M addresses.
The second and third sets are much larger than the first because
they mostly include interfaces in two IPv6 /32 prefixes operated
by the same access network; this portion of the router IP address
list is almost entirely (99%) unresponsive to our probes, and are
likely home gateways rather than an ISP’s BGP-speaking routers.
Table 1 summarizes our measurement parameters, and figure 2
shows the size of our probe list and the number of interfaces that
sent incrementing IPID values over time.































Figure 2: Number of interfaces in probing set, and number
of interfaces that respond with an incrementing IPID value,
over time. We label the three different measurement param-
eter periods defined in table 1.
(a) 18 Jan 2015 – 18 Oct 2016
Static list: 83,393 interfaces seen in CAIDA traceroutes
for Dec 2014.
Probing rate: 100 pps.
Probing of not applicable addresses: every 12-24 hours.
(b) 18 Oct 2016 – 24 Feb 2017
Static list: 1,086,047 interfaces seen in CAIDA traceroutes
for June to October 2016, and addresses in (a).
Probing rate: 225 pps.
Probing of not applicable addresses: every 12-24 hours.
(c) 24 Feb 2017 – 30 May 2017
Dynamic list: obtained from CAIDA traceroutes every two
hours, and addresses in (b).
Probing rate: 200 pps.
Probing of not applicable addresses: every hour for 24
hours, then every 7-14 days.
Table 1: Measurement parameters for acquiring interface
addresses, and how the prober handles interfaces that do
not send incrementing IPID values (i.e. interfaces where our
method is not applicable).
The prober runs continuously in a tight loop such that it begins
a new round of probing as soon as the prior round finishes. The
prober shuffles the set of addresses to probe in each round, and
maintains inter-round state in an SQLite database. The prober sends
packets asynchronously and maintains a constant packet rate. We
conducted all probing in this work from a single host on a well-
provisioned, native IPv6 academic network in the United States.
By directly probing routers, rather than edge systems or net-
works, our adaptive prober achieves significant efficiency. For ex-
ample, on December 30th 2016, we sent approximately 17.4M pack-
ets toward 1,086,055 unique router interfaces. Given our 1300 byte
probe packet size, this equates to ∼ 200pps (∼ 2Mbps). By compari-
son, existing approaches to outage inference, e.g., [39], require two
orders of magnitude higher packet per second probing rate.
Further, methods that directly measure the edge require a rela-
tively stable set of known responsive nodes. Whereas prior work
has successfully built such “hitlists” for IPv4 [39], the exponentially
larger IPv6 address space, combined with the popular use of pri-
vate, temporal IPv6 addresses [36] presents practical difficulties in
simply obtaining a set of edge IPv6 hosts to probe [38]. By directly
Algorithm 1 findOutage(id[], tx[])
v ← 0 ▷ Velocity
min_id ← 0
reboots ← {}
for i ∈ |id |:
v ′ = (id[i] − id[i − 1])/(tx[i] − tx[i − 1])
v = 0.8v + 0.2v ′
E[spin] = (tx[i] − tx[i − 1]) ∗v
if id[i] < id[i − 1]
if ( |id[i] −min_id | < 216) ∧ (id[i] > 216)
Cyclic
else if rand_seq(id[i, i + 10])
Random
else
reboots ← reboots ∪ tx
else if id[i] > id[i − 1] + E[spin] ∗ 10
if rand_seq(id[i, i + 10])
Random
else
min_id ← id[i] ▷ Cyclic reboot
reboots ← reboots ∪ tx
if id[i] < min_id
min_id ← id[i]
return reboots
probing IPv6 routers (which can much more easily be discovered
via traceroute), we sidestep the stable IPv6 hitlist problem entirely.
4.1.2 Reboot Inference. Our probing (§4.1.1) produces approxi-
mately 10M IPID samples per day. To facilitate efficient range-based
queries, we place all time series data, including IPIDs and BGP up-
dates, in an Apache Cassandra NoSQL database [30], with the target
and timestamp as primary keys.
Algorithm 1 describes how we infer a router reboot from an
IPID time series. If the router appears to assign IPID values from a
counter, then a discontinuity in the time series implies the counter
reset. Recall that the IPv6 IPID is a 32-bit value, and the counter
only increments for fragments, so overflow is rare. An IPID less that
the previous IPID from the interface indicates a potential reboot,
however this non-monotonicity can also be due to either random
or cyclic counters.
Some routers based on Linux produce time series that are cyclic;
these routers maintain a counter state per host to which they send
fragmented packets. The counter state is initialized to value X de-
rived from a secret cryptographically generated at system boot,
and the destination host’s IP address. When the router removes the
per-host state and then re-creates the state when we probe it next,
the router re-initializes the IPID state to X – we term these “cyclic”
interfaces. We infer a cyclic reboot when the router chooses a dif-
ferent valueX ′ to initialize the per-destination state, a consequence
of the router’s secret changing when it rebooted.
A cyclic reboot may result in an IPID initialized to an X which
is larger than the previous IPID sent by the router. To avoid a
false positive due to interfaces with a large natural IPID velocity,
Algorithm 1 computes E[spin], the expected amount of IPID change
given a weighted moving average of the historical IPID velocity. If




































Figure 3: CDF of minimum and maximum outage window
lengths measured. Half of the maximum outage windows
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Figure 4: CDF outages per router for the 59,175 routers that
experienced an outage. 71% had less than ten outages during
our probing.
the discontinuity is larger than an order of magnitude more than
the expected change, and the sequence is non-random, we infer a
cyclic reboot.
Our method allows us to infer an outage window – a period
of time in which the router restarted. Figure 3 shows the mini-
mum and maximum outage window lengths for each address that
was monotonic or cyclic during our probing. At least half of the
maximum outage windows were shorter than 31 minutes, though
another 22% of the windows were at least 2 hours, and 4% of the
maximum outage windows in our dataset were more than 24 hours.
Figure 4 shows the number of router outages inferred per router,
for those routers that had at least one inferred outage. We inferred
24% of these routers had one outage during our measurements,
53% had four outages, and 71% had fewer than ten outages during
our probing. These short and infrequent outages is consistent with
these devices operating as critical infrastructure.
Figure 5 shows the daily number of rebooting routers. There is
some decay in the number of reboots we inferred per day between
January 2015 and February 2017, as our router sample was mostly
static over this time period, and some routers became unrespon-
sive. Because routers rarely restart owing to their nature as critical
infrastructure, a low-rate probing balances our ability to capture


















Figure 5: Number of inferred outages, per day. We inferred
≈200 per day between January 2015 and October 2016, and
≈1K per day after we updated the probe list in October 2016,
and up to ≈5K per day after we began dynamically updating
the probe list in February 2017. We label the three different
measurement parameter periods defined in table 1.
4.2 Associating networks with routers
The second fundamental problem is determining which networks
are routed by which routers. We again use CAIDA traceroutes to
build a router graph that associates each interface in the graph with
destination prefixes the interface is in the path towards. For instance,
assume interface I is observed in the traceroute to destination D.
We find the longest matching prefix P to which D belongs, and note
that I is involved in providing reachability to P .
In December 2016, the Ark project used a set of 55 IPv6 vantage
points distributed around the world, each of which probed two
addresses in each routed prefix, the first (::1), as well as a randomly
generated address. Naturally, the closer I is to P , the more P depends
on I (and, conversely, interfaces close to our vantage points are
weakly associated with a large number of prefixes). Therefore, we
also labeled each interfacewith the distance, in IP hops, the interface
was from the AS originating the prefix.
Figure 6 illustrates our distance computation. We define distance
as the number of IP hops a router interface found by traceroute is
from the customer edge border router for the destination probed
by traceroute. The first router belonging to the destination AS
has a distance of zero, routers with negative distance are within
the destination AS; routers with positive distance are before the
destination AS. The first router in the destination AS will often
appear in traceroute using an address assigned by their provider
for the interconnecting link. Therefore, we infer the destination
AS border router in traceroute is the hop prior to the first hop that
used an address BGP-originated by the destination AS.
4.3 Correlating with BGP Control Plane
We used the University of Oregon’s Routeviews archived routing
table snapshots and update messages to provide a BGP-level view
of routing. We ingested into a Cassandra time series database RIB
snapshots at midnight UTC for each day from 18 January 2015
to 30 May 2017, as well as all update messages between each RIB
snapshot. We used all peers providing data to the “routeviews6”
collector, where multiple Tier-1 IPv6 ISPs provide a global view of
routing from their perspectives, including AT&T, Verizon, Hurri-
cane Electric, CenturyLink, GTT Communications, and NTT.
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Figure 6: Computing distance of router reboot from AS an-
nouncing route in BGP. A router with distance zero is likely
to be the AS’s border router, a router with negative distance
is within the AS, and a router with positive distance is out-
side the AS.
A router outage can manifest itself in the BGP control plane in
four different ways, depending on the number of routes advertised
by that router to neighboring BGP routers that were selected as
the best path. Because of the information-hiding properties of BGP,
where only the best route is advertised to external peers, a router
outage topologically close to the advertised prefix is more likely
to result in control plane activity because it is more likely to be in
the best path for neighboring ASes. In this work, we consider four
event types, and we empirically correlate them in time and distance
from the AS announcing the route.
Event Types: First, a complete withdrawal occurs when a router
that has an outage is present in all external BGP paths towards the
prefix. In this work, we classify a prefix as being completely with-
drawn if no vantage point has a route for 70 consecutive seconds.
A complete withdrawal occurs when the router is a single point of
failure for that prefix. Second, a partial withdrawal occurs when
a router that has an outage does not cause all VPs to withdraw
the route, but at least some do withdraw, each for 70 consecutive
seconds. A partial withdrawal can occur when some VPs carry the
route, but other VPs do not converge on the same path because they
did not receive it through the export policy of other ASes. In this
work, we also observed individual Routeviews looking glass peers
carrying routes while all others withdrew the prefix for multiple
hours, masking a complete withdrawal. Third, churn occurs when a
router that has an outage is present in the path for some peers, but
those peers were able to converge on an alternative route during
the outage. Finally, no BGP activity can occur during a router outage
when other equal cost paths are available with the same AS path,
so no BGP control message is required.
Time Effects: Figure 7 shows the four ways that a router out-
age can correlate in time with a BGP withdrawal. First, and most
common in our data, the withdrawal event is contained within
the router outage window. Specifically, the time that the last peer
withdraws is after the left edge of the outage window and the time
Outage Window
Withdraw-Contained










Figure 7: Correlating router outages with BGP control plane
(W)ithdrawal and (A)nnouncements. More router outage
windows in our data contain withdrawals, rather than with-
drawals before or announcements after outage windows.
that the first peer announces is before the right edge of the out-
age window. This is the most common effect in our data, as most
withdrawals more than 70 seconds in length were still less than the
approximate 15-minute probing intervals of our prober. We believe
these short withdrawals are mostly caused by operators upgrading
the software and rebooting the router.
Second, outage-contained occurs when the operator shuts down
all BGP sessions with the router’s peers before restarting the router,
and the sessions come back up after we detected the router outage
ended. Because of our 15-minute granularity of probing, we likely
missed some outage-contained correlations. Third, withdraw-before
occurs when the operator shuts down all BGP sessions with the
router’s peers before restarting the router, we probe the router be-
fore it restarts, and the router restarts BGP sessions with neighbors
before we probe the router again. Finally, announce-after occurs
when the first announcement after the outage occurs after we de-
tected the router had restarted.
Distance Effects: Figure 8 shows the effect of an inferred router
outage on BGP control plane activity for outages occurring during
February 2015. We counted each reboot/prefix pair once, to reduce
the effect that a few routers with frequent outages could have.
The closer the router is to the destination AS, the more likely the
outage will result in BGP churn and prefix withdrawal. In particular,
10% of border routers operated by a destination AS resulted in a
complete withdrawal. We investigate the nature of these outages
thoroughly in §5; we include figure 8 here to provide evidence that
our technique yields reasonable inferences.
Figure 8 also includes withdrawal and churn measurements for
the six-hour period before the router outage for the same outage
window length, as a control. In the control figure, there is substan-
tially less BGP activity for the affected prefixes, and there were no
withdrawals of the prefixes lasting at least 70 seconds. We therefore
believe the elevated level of churn and withdrawals were caused
by the inferred router outages.
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Figure 8: Impact of router outages on BGP routing during an inferred router outage as a function of distance the router is from
the border router of the destination AS, and a control of six hours before the outage for the same duration, during February
2015. A router outage was more likely to correlate with churn and withdrawal the closer the router is to the border of the AS.
50% of pairs had
1−2 peers withdraw
nearly all peers withdraw
10% of pairs had
 0
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1







Figure 9: The fraction of Routeviews peers that withdrew
a prefix when not all peers withdrew. 10% of router-prefix
pairs had nearly all peers withdraw the prefix.
Figure 9 shows the fraction of peers that withdrew a prefix when
not all peers withdrew a prefix. As with figure 8, we only plot each
router/prefix pair once. For half of the pairs, only 1-2 peers withdrew
a prefix; however, 10% of pairs had nearly all peers withdraw the
prefix, but did not meet the criteria for a full withdrawal.
4.4 Limitations
Measurement of network resilience at the router-level is fraught
with challenges because the available data is imperfect. In this
section, we discuss the most important challenges and limitations.
Limited to IPv6.Our IPID reboot inference is limited to probing
routers with an IPv6 interface. While IPv4 packets also contain an
IPID field, and router implementations frequently reset the IPID
counter to zero and populate the IPID field monotonically, there
are two fundamental problems with using the IPID for IPv4 reboot
inference. First, whereas IPID is an optional extension header in
IPv6, IPID is a required IPv4 header value, so every IPv4 control-
plane packet requires a unique value. Many routers therefore have
high IPID velocity due to their participation in routing protocols and
network management. Second, whereas the IPID is a 32-bit counter
in IPv6, it is only 16-bits in IPv4. High-velocities combined with
small counters imply that we would have to frequently sample the
IPv4 counter to avoid misinterpreting a counter-wrap as a reboot.
While the IPID velocity for a particular router may typically be
low, any probing system must handle large bursts of control traffic,
for instance when the router is exchanging routing information, or
when the router is polled by a management system. Conservatively
assuming a maximum control-plane transmission rate of 100Mbps
and 1500 byte packets, the Nyquist rate dictates that each router
must be probed approximately once every four seconds. While prior
work has shown the feasibility of high-rate IPID probing [8], the
scale required for Internet-wide uptime monitoring precludes IPv4
probing. Further, such a probing rate is effectively equivalent to
high-rate reachability probing, and yet it would still be impossible
to differentiate any period of unreachability from an actual reboot.
Requires incrementing IPID. Even when restricting our tech-
nique to routers with IPv6 interfaces, our method only works for
those routers that respond and send fragments with an IPID value
assigned from a counter. Therefore, our method is only able to de-
tect a fraction of all router outages in the Internet. In prior work, we
found that routers manufactured by Cisco, Huawei, Vyatta, HP, and
Mikrotik returned sequential fragment identifiers [33]. However,
routers manufactured by Juniper return random identifiers.
Complex events could be masked. Our method might incor-
rectly associate a complex event, such as a power outage causing
multiple simultaneous router outages, with a single router. While
we can detect multiple overlapping router outages when the routers
involved all assign IPID values from a counter, we were unable to
detect this complex event if only one router involved assigns IPID
values from a counter. Further, we were only able to probe routers
observed in traceroute; other routers only on a backup path that
simultaneously failed were therefore not probed.
BGP dynamics can mask single points of failure. Correctly
inferring a router is a single point of failure is challenging due
to the complexities in topology, routing, and configuration. As
discussed in §2, BGP routers can use a MRAI timer to reduce churn
during path exploration by not announcing a route for a prefix
more regularly than the timer, and operators may deploy route
flap damping to further suppress updates. Routers may use a MRAI
timer of 30 seconds, though large transit networks often reduce the
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Network Correct Incorrect Not Validated
R S R S R S
US University 7 7 0 0 8 8
US R&E backbone #1 2 3 0 2 3 0
US R&E backbone #2 3 0 0 0 1 4
NZ R&E backbone 11 4 0 2 22 27
Total: 23 14 0 4 34 39
Table 2: Summary of validated reboot windows (R) and sin-
gle point of failures (S). Most reboot events were not vali-
dated due to the difficulty of confirming events prior to the
most recent.
timer to allow faster convergence. In this work, we inferred that
a Routeviews peer had no route if the peer did not report a route
for the prefix for at least 70 seconds, which allows for two default
MRAI timer values, as well as a 10-second fudge. Router outages
that completed more quickly than 70 seconds would be classified
as churn, understating the importance of the router to that prefix.
Infrequent update of destination prefixes. Prior to Febru-
ary 2017, the set of destination prefixes used to seed CAIDA’s IPv6
traceroute data collection was infrequently updated – every few
months, rather than continuously as new IPv6 prefixes were an-
nounced. Our process to associate network prefixes to routers (§4.2)
requires traceroutes towards an address in the prefix in order to es-
tablish a dependence between a router that appears in a traceroute
and a corresponding prefix.
4.5 Validation
We contacted operators at six different networks for validation of
our inferences. We focused on operators of research and education
(R&E) networks, as we believed they would be willing to provide
feedback on our work. Further, we believed they would be willing
to refer us to their customer network operators, in the cases where
only the customer could supply ground truth on the root cause of
the outage. Five operators responded, and four provided feedback;
the fifth declined to provide feedback without permission of the
members involved, and the sixth did not respond to our request.
We asked the operators to validate that our reboot inferences
were correct (true positives), and that we did not miss any reboots
(false negatives). We also asked the operators to validate our single
point of failure inferences; for routers where we did not detect
any full withdrawals, we asked them to confirm the routers were
not a single point of failure. Table 2 summarizes the validation
outcome. The validation shows the technique is able to correctly
infer router reboot windows when the router assigns IPID values
from a counter. Where the operators were able to, they confirmed
we did not miss any outages; however, the operators had difficulty
confirming outages prior to the last outage. Our technique is also
usually able to correctly infer dependence of a prefix on a router.
US University:We contacted the network operator of a large
campus network for feedback on six different routers that had re-
booted. In total, we detected 15 reboots associated with the routers,
and no prefix withdrawals correlated with any of the reboots. They
used SNMP queries for the sysUpTime counter to validate four of
the six outage windows, and logged into two routers where the
counter was unable to validate because the counter had rolled over
after 497 days of uptime [35].
They had no reasonable way to confirm inferences prior to the
last reboot of the six routers we identified, with the exception
of one core router, where they validated two reboot events. The
routers were all internal to their network, and provided connectivity
to small subnets of the larger IPv6 address space. The operator
validated our inference that the routers were not a single point of
failure for the larger prefixes advertised in BGP. All of the previous
six reboot inferences were the last time the routers in question
had rebooted; the seventh reboot inference was validated through
personal knowledge of the operator.
US R&E backbone #1:We discussed five router reboot events
involving four routers with a US state-level R&E network backbone.
They explained that larger universities have two routers and redun-
dant connections to the R&E backbone, but the smaller members
have a single connection to a single router in the R&E backbone.
They used their trouble ticket system to provide validation and
context on the reboots we inferred.
For the first router, they reported their provider-edge router
within a University data center was down for more than two hours
as part of a data center-wide power outage. They confirmed the
reboot, and that the router was a single point of failure for a prefix
that their customer announced in BGP. However, because all but one
Routeviews peer withdrew the prefix, our system did not classify
the router as a single point of failure. During the outage window, the
single Routeviews peer periodically reported updates for the route,
though these updates could not have come from the provider-edge
router, as the router was powered off at the time.
For the second router, they confirmed a customer router that
was a single point of failure for one prefix likely rebooted within
the inferred outage window, as their BGP session with the router
restarted within the window. They reported the BGP session was
quickly re-established; while all 20 Routeviews peers withdrew the
prefix for at least some period of time, only three were without a
route for more than 30 seconds, and our system did not classify the
router as a single point of failure.
For the third router, they reported the router was within their
customer’s network, and they believed it was not a single point of
failure for any prefixes, which is congruent with the absence of BGP
activity during this time. However, they did not have information
that would allow them to validate the two reboots involving the
device. They were unable to provide any information about a fourth
router that rebooted more than two years prior, but that we were
correct in not inferring a single point of failure for any prefix.
USR&E backbone #2:We sent the operator of a second US R&E
backbone a list of 11 routers with interfaces using addresses from
within their BGP-announced prefixes. Due to the labor involved in
searching their systems for archived SNMP data, they only provided
feedback for four of the routers, three of which we inferred to be a
single point of failure in BGP for at least one prefix. While they did
not provide any comment on the inferred single points of failure,
they did provide feedback on router reboot events.
For the first router, they had no record of a reboot occurring
during the inferred window. They had a record for a crash four days
earlier, however we had not been probing the router during that
time. Nevertheless, the reboot was correlated with the complete
withdrawal of a prefix.































































Figure 10: CDF of minimum and maximum withdrawal durations, per router/prefix pair, for complete and partial durations.
For the second router, they reported that it was one of their
routers, and confirmed that they had an alert for the router during
the window, and that it had probably rebooted. They provided
three further events for the router; however, the router had stopped
responding to our probes before the subsequent events, so we were
not able to infer any behavior for the router.
For the third router, they reported the interface was on their
customer’s router, and that the link went down to the router during
the outage window. This event was correlated with the detected
complete withdrawal of a customer prefix.
For the fourth router, they confirmed the reboot we reported was
a known reboot event. They provided another eight other events
that might also have been reboot events, however the IPID sequence
from the router suggests they were not reboot events.
NZ R&E backbone: We discussed 32 reboot events across 8
routers with the operator of a New Zealand R&E backbone, and
approached two of their members for further elaboration. The oper-
ator confirmed they had BGP outages correlated with reboot events
archived in their monitoring infrastructure for four routers we in-
ferred as having rebooted once each. They were unable to help with
five events for two other routers, as the outages were in January
and April 2015 when they had a different network architecture.
We approached the operators of two other routers individually.
The seventh router had five reboots inferred; the operator had con-
figured external data-plane monitoring at five-minute intervals,
and the reboots correlated with four data-plane outages. The oper-
ator was unable to confirm the fifth outage because the monitoring
granularity was too wide. The operator confirmed the router was a
single point of failure for a more specific prefix they announced in
BGP using the backbone’s ASN. Even though there was a covering
prefix in BGP announced by the backbone, there was no reachability
to the addresses covered by the more specific.
The eighth router had 18 reboot events inferred across the 2.5
years of probing. However, the operator could only confirm the
final two reboots in 2017, as they had no data allowing them to
validate prior events. The router was a single point of failure in
BGP for a single prefix; however, we had not observed the router in
traceroute paths in 2017, so while we correctly inferred the reboots,
we had not inferred the router was a single point of failure.
Summary: In total (table 2), we validated 23 reboot events with
no false positives or false negatives, and 14 single point of failures
with four false negatives, owing to limitations discussed in §4.4.
5 RESULTS
In total, we inferred 749,451 reboots involving 59,175 (40%) of
149,560 responsive routers between January 18th 2015 and May
30th 2017. As discussed in §4, most of the detected router outages
were shorter than 2 hours (figure 3) and most routers that restarted
did so fewer than two times (figure 4). Importantly, we were only
able to correlate 2,385 routers – 4.0% of the routers that had out-
ages in our dataset – with a prefix being completely withdrawn,
after excluding more complex events involving multiple routers
overlapping in time (§5.5). Figure 8 shows that, where necessary,
BGP was able to converge on alternative paths for the majority
of router outages, and outages that caused a complete withdrawal
were confined to the edge of the network – either topologically
adjacent to the affected network, or within the affected network.
In our data, we inferred that 59% of all single points of failure were
the customer-edge border router, 8% were the provider-edge border
router, and 29% were within the destination AS itself. These prop-
erties are consistent with previously published work describing the
likely behavior of networks based on a first-principles approach that
included router-level topologies from two academic networks [31];
our work is the first to measure the actual impact of router outages
on the Internet’s BGP routing system at scale.
Among the 2,385 single point of failure routers, we used Max-
mind [34] to geolocate the ::1 address of the IPv6 prefixes involved
in these failures to 90 different countries. 25% of the prefixes geolo-
cate to the United States, 13% to Brazil, 8% to Great Britain, 6% to
India, and 2-3% each to Russia, Australia, Indonesia, Germany, and
Ukraine. This geodistribution largely mirrored the overall distribu-
tion of countries in our monitored dataset, implying that outages
were no more prevalent in any given country than another.
5.1 Prefix Withdrawal Duration
Figure 10a shows the distribution of complete prefix withdrawal
durations for each router/prefix pair. For each prefix that was with-
drawn, we computed the minimum and maximum duration the
prefix was withdrawn in BGP. 50% of the minimum durations were
less than 5 minutes in length, suggesting most router outages were
short lived, and likely caused by a router restart due to maintenance.
However, the tail is long, as 30% of prefixes were withdrawn for at
least 30 minutes.
Similarly, figure 10b shows the distribution of partial prefix with-
drawal durations for each router/prefix pair. As with the duration of
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the full withdrawals, the partial withdrawals were short: 50% were
less than five minutes. As with the complete withdrawals, the tail is
long, and manual investigation of the longer withdrawal durations,
particularly when nearly all peers withdrew the prefix (figure 9)
revealed apparent bugs in BGP implementations. For example, we
confirmed with one R&E network operator that an inferred multi-
hour router outage was a single point of failure for their customer,
despite the fact that one Routeviews peer retained a route to the
prefix, and periodically reported updates for the route. However,
these updates could not have come from the provider-edge router,
as the router was powered off for data center maintenance.
5.2 Presence of Covering Prefixes
The 2,385 routers that we were able to correlate with a prefix with-
drawal were in paths toward 3,396 prefixes. Of these 3,396 with-
drawn prefixes, 1,022 (30%) were covered by a less specific prefix
that was not simultaneously withdrawn, suggesting that the more
specific prefix that was withdrawn could be present in the routing
table for traffic engineering purposes. Indeed, 699 (68%) of the more
specific prefixes had a covering prefix announced by the same AS.
The 2,374 prefixes that were not covered by a less specific prefix
when they were withdrawn were correlated with 1,726 routers that
had an outage – 2.9% of the routers that had outages in our dataset.
5.3 Impact on AS-level Reachability
The list of routers we probed was updated at the end of October
2016, coinciding with CAIDA’s probe list being updated, so for the
following analysis we used router outages inferred during Novem-
ber and December 2016, as we have traceroute paths for all IPv6
routed prefixes in October 2016. This allows us to correlate all an-
nounced prefixes with routers, rather than the subset probed before
October 2016. In total, we were able to infer prefix withdrawals cor-
related with router outages for 149 ASes during these two months;
82 of these ASes (55%) were completely unrouted in BGP during
these router outages. The routers were single points of failure for
these 82 ASes.
5.4 Impact of AS-level Multi-homing
To better understand where single points of failure reside, we used
a January 16, 2017 Routeviews RIB to construct the IPv6 AS-level
graph. We then found the degree of the ASes corresponding to
the IPv6 prefixes involved in the identified single points of failure.
Figure 11 shows the cumulative fraction of ASes originating pre-
fixes that represented single points of failure as a function of AS
degree. For context, we also plot the AS degree distribution for
the monitored population, which includes IPv6 router interfaces
that responded with fragment identifiers in the final 24 hours of
our dataset. Here, we use longest prefix matching against the same
Routeviews RIB to map each router interface to the AS originating
the corresponding IPv6 prefix.
As seen in Figure 11, 21% of the routers in the monitored popula-
tion belong to degree-one stub ASes, while 42% of the single points
of failure are in degree-one stub ASes. Although we intuitively
expect stub ASes to be less resilient to single router failures, it is in-
teresting to note that we observe single points of failure in non-stub
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Figure 11: Cumulative distribution of ASes as function de-
gree. While only 21% of the routers in the monitored popu-
lation belong to degree one ASes, 42% of the single points of
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Figure 12: The effect of AS-level multi-homing on pre-
fix/router pairs. In our data, prefixes that were completely
withdrawn as a result of a router outage outside the network
(distances 1-3) were nearly exclusively propagated through
a single upstream AS.
routers representing single points of failure had degree-two – sug-
gesting that a single router peered with two different providers.
Further, while the fraction of high-degree ASes was small, the in-
stances of single points of failure we found in these ASes is likely
attributable to exchange points and other highly interconnected in-
frastructure. These findings underscore the fact that analyzing the
AS-level topology without the router-level interconnection context
is insufficient to show a network is resilient to failure.
Figure 12 shows the effect of AS-level multi-homing on pre-
fix/router pairs for our 2.5 years of router outage data. For each
router outage where the router was within three IP hops of the AS
announcing the prefix, we classified the BGP event type according
to whether the prefix was announced via a single upstream or via
multiple upstreams. In our data, prefixes that were completely with-
drawn as a result of a router outage outside the network (distances
1-3) were nearly exclusively propagated through a single upstream
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Figure 13: Correlating router outages with IPv4 prefix withdrawals and churn: distribution of the fraction of Routeviews peers
for the associated IPv4 prefix during versus outside the inferred outage window.
AS. A router outage at distance 1, the provider-edge (PE) router,
implied the connecting AS was single-homed to a single PE router.
Router outages at distance 0, the customer-edge (CE) router, usu-
ally (63.5% of outages) implied the prefix was announced through
a single upstream AS. However, the remaining 36.5% of outages
where a CE router experienced an outage were BGP-announced
through multiple upstream ASes, implying the same CE router was
used to connect through multiple upstreams. Even though the af-
fected ASes had provider diversity at the AS-level, our router-level
measurements still inferred their CE router to be a single point
of failure, further showing the benefit of synthesizing BGP and
router-level data when analyzing the resilience of ASes in BGP.
5.5 Overlapping Router Outages
In our data, some routers that were in the path towards the same
prefix had outages that overlapped in time, and we filtered these
events from our analysis of single points of failure. There are multi-
ple possible explanations for these events, including power outages
that impact multiple neighbors, and operator router maintenance
activities that overlap. Further, it is possible the two routers had
non-overlapping outages, but our probing granularity was not fine-
grained enough to capture this effect. Because router outages were
rarely correlated with a prefix withdrawal if they were more than
three hops from the AS announcing the prefix, we focused on
overlapping router outages no further than three hops from the
destination AS, as well as router outages within the destination
network. In total, we inferred 865 overlapping router outages that
we correlated with 619 prefixes.
We examined the adjacency of these routers using the distance
metric we described in §4.2. Only 15% of these events involved
routers the same distance from the edge of the destination AS: 30%
and 27% of impacted routers were separated by one and two hops,
respectively, implying a localized outage. We detected two routers
with overlapping outage windows in 64% of the events; 33% had
three separate routers involved. We emphasize the fraction of com-
plete withdrawal events containing overlapping outage windows
is a small fraction of the overall set, consistent with the relatively
small number of short events per day (figures 3 and 5).
5.6 Correlation with IPv4 Outages
As the IPv6 Internet matures, its topology grows increasingly con-
gruent with the IPv4 Internet [16]. To understand the extent to
which IPv6 router restarts impacted IPv4, we examined 28637 re-
boots experienced by 2665 IPv6 interfaces – a ∼ 5% sample of all
interfaces where we inferred at least one reboot. We associated IPv6
router interfaces with a set of IPv4 prefixes as follows. For each
IPv6 interface, we determined the origin AS of the IPv6 prefixes as-
sociated with that interface in §4.2. Using daily RIB snapshots from
Routeviews, we found all IPv4 prefixes announced by that origin
AS on that day. Using the method described in §4.3, we examined
the set of BGP update messages received at the Routeviews looking
glass to determine the activity for these IPv4 prefixes during the
time period of the IPv6 router restart. Our algorithm links IPv4
prefixes to the router most likely to originate the prefix. Thus, if
the router suffers an outage and represents an IPv4 single point of
failure, we expect to lose reachability to the prefix.
We examined two distinct time periods for each interface in
our analysis: one within our inferred outage window, and a second
period, of the same duration, two days prior to the outage. Using the
daily RIB IPv4 snapshots, we determined the number of Routeviews
peers advertising the prefix, and then replayed the BGP update
messages to maintain state over the number of peers concurrently
advertising or not advertising the IPv4 prefix. To determine the
extent of the outage, we used the ratio of the maximum number
of peers that withdrew the route to the number of peers that had
been advertising the route.
Figure 13a shows the distribution of router outages as a function
of ratio of affected IPv4 Routeviews peers, before and during the
inferred outage. 47% of the within-window outages resulted in no
peers withdrawing the IPv4 route, suggesting that these prefixes
were robust to the failure of single routers. However, we observed
a distinct correlation between withdrawals during the outage as
compared to outside the outage. Similarly, Figure 13b shows dis-
tinctly more update churn for the IPv4 prefixes during the outage
window. While none of the IPv4 prefixes we examined were fully
withdrawn outside the outage, approximately 10% of the outages
resulted in more than 90% of the peers withdrawing the prefix.
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5.7 Impact of Outages on Application Services
A consequence of an outage is that both the customers of the af-
fected provider, as well as the application-layer services they pro-
vide to the Internet, become unreachable. While there do not exist
good IPv6 address census data due to the sheer size of the address
space, we make use of the daily IPv4 censys.io scanning data [18]
as an indicator of the outage impact for a single point of failure.
In particular, we examined those IPv4 prefixes tied to an inferred
IPv6 router reboot (§5.6) where at least 90% of the Routeviews
peers withdrew that prefix in the inferred outage time window. For
each IPv4 address in an April 2017 censys.io daily scan, we used
a Routeviews BGP table to find the longest matching prefix and
determine whether the host belonged to a prefix that experienced
an outage. For the IPv4 prefixes that experienced an outage in our
sample, we found 39,107 active hosts in the censys data, 25,592
hosts listening on port 80 (HTTP), 16,321 hosts listening on port
443 (HTTPS), 7383 SMTP listeners, 5127 IMAP servers, 11,277 SSH
servers, and 7922 responsive DNS servers. While this methodology
yields only a rough approximation of an outage impact, it shows
that non-trivial numbers of applications were affected by the single
points of failure we discovered.
5.8 Impact of Outages on the Data Plane
To better understand how our work complements end-host data-
plane probing approaches, we sought to quantify the relationship
between outages, data-plane reachability, and BGP activity. We
identified responsive IPv6 targets within each of the 41K globally
routed prefixes by sending ICMP6 echo requests to the first 16 ad-
dresses within each prefix. From this simple survey, we discovered
at least one active target within 11,003 prefixes (∼27% of the 41K
total prefixes in May 2017). We then probed a single address in each
of the 11,003 prefixes at 30-second intervals between May 23-30
2017. To counter the effect of single probe loss, we sent a second
probe if there was no response to the first probe.
Then, for each router outage inferred during the week of probing,
we examined the impact, if any, on data-plane responsiveness. Our
binary metric of correlation between end-host data-plane probing
and inferred router outages determined if: (1) the loss of active
probes overlapped with the inferred router outage window; (2)
the router was responsive before and after; and (3) the responsive
address was not an alias of the router that rebooted, so that we were
probing an end-host reachable via the router, rather than another
interface on the router itself.
We first examined the set of router outages over the May 23-30
2017 window inferred via IPID sequence discontinuities that iden-
tified a single point of failure, i.e. those outages that resulted in a
BGP withdrawal. While we might expect a loss of data-plane reach-
ability due to the BGP withdrawal, the withdrawn prefix may be a
more specific announcement that belonged to a larger aggregate (a
“covering prefix”) that was not withdrawn.
In total, there were 36 distinct router outage / complete BGP
withdrawal pairs that we correlated with loss of active probes; 13 of
these had a covering prefix that was not simultaneously withdrawn.
While our sample size is small, we found no evidence that a covering
IPv6 prefix provided data-plane reachability when a more specific
prefix was withdrawn due to a router outage.
Second, we examined inferred router outages during our data-
plane probing window that were not clear single points of failure;
that is, the outage did not result in a complete BGP withdrawal for
the associated prefixes. We found 138 router outages that correlated
with a loss of active probes to unique prefixes, despite the prefix
remaining in the global BGP table. Thus, while our technique did
not deem these routers to be BGP-level single points of failure, our
probing identified them as data-plane single points of failure.
Our result that nearly four times more router outages were cor-
related with active probe loss than with complete BGP withdrawal
is congruent with prior work. Using Hubble [26], Katz-Bassett et al.
reported that the majority of reachability problems they found were
uncovered with active probes, with reachability problems often not
correlatedwith BGP activity for the prefix. Similarly, Trinocular [39]
finds that control-plane measurements underestimate outages.
However, by tying network outages to individual router outages,
our technique complements existing control-plane and data-plane
methods – whereas data-plane probing can identify reachability
issues, it cannot accurately identify the root-cause of the outage.
In future work, we plan to more closely couple data-plane probing
with our router outage detection framework.
6 CONCLUSION
The resilience of the Internet to individual points of failure has
been argued in the literature for nearly two decades, and there
has been significant work to undermine the theory that the Inter-
net has high-degree hubs crucial to overall network connected-
ness [1, 12, 31, 49]. However, there has been a dearth of empirical
data allowing researchers and policymakers to understand AS-level
reliability cognizant of the underlying router-level interconnection.
In this paper, we take a first empirical step towards understanding
the resilience of the Internet to individual router outages through
the opportunistic correlation of router outages with BGP routing
information. In our data, collected from a survey of 149,560 IPv6
routers responsive to our method, we inferred that 59,175 (40%) had
an outage during our study. Only 2,385 routers (4.0%) were corre-
lated with complete withdrawals involving 3,396 prefixes where the
routers appeared in traceroute paths towards the prefixes. Further,
2,374 (70%) of the withdrawn prefixes were not covered by a less
specific prefix, so only 1,726 routers (2.9%) of those that restarted
were BGP-level single points of failure for at least one network, and
routers that were single points of failures were over-represented in
stub ASes. We were also able to correlate IPv6 router outages with
IPv4 control plane instability, reinforcing that while our study was
applied to IPv6 routing out of methodological need, failures were
present in IPv4 as well.
Our method and data also has a network security impact, and
therefore also ethical considerations [37]. During the course of
our Internet-wide measurement campaign over 2.5 years, which
we conducted at a low rate, we received a single query from a
network operator about our measurements, suggesting that the
method could also be used by an attacker in a stealthy manner. The
security implications of predictable fragment identification values
are well known [21], as they provide, for example, a side-channel
that allows an adversary to infer the number of systems behind
a middle-box [4], and the packet sending rate and open ports of
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an end-host [2]. To improve privacy, some Linux kernels use a
hash-based algorithm to select an initial identifier value, and then
assign identifier values sequentially from the initial value. However,
Knockel et al.were able to leverage an artifact of the implementation
to infer if two third-party computers were communicating [28]. In
this work, we also show the fragment identifier side channel can
be used to infer the impact that the failure of a single router has on
the Internet’s routing system.
Our method and data has utility beyond our initial study of
network resilience. Our method and data could also be used, for
example, to study the deployment of BGP configurations that limit
routing convergence, data plane performance during routing con-
vergence, study the evolution of network resilience, develop ac-
tionable information for national CERT bodies to assist network
operators to deploy more resilient routing, and to cross-validate
other outage detection methods. In order to balance the research
utility of our dataset with the possibility it can be used to do harm
until operators have deployed routers without the side channel,
we will release our raw data to researchers via a suitable legal
framework [42].
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